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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the impact of board gender diversity on corporate environmental strategy and 
financial performance. Based on 12 corporate environmental policies in 3389 firms worldwide, we 
identified four types of corporate environmental strategies by using the latent class regression model: 
an inactive strategy, a reactive strategy, a pollution prevention strategy and a sustainable development 
strategy. The empirical evidence shows that women on boards contribute to the promotion of proactive 
environmental strategies, including the pollution prevention strategy, which is found to bring about 
sustained competitive advantage in both short-term and long-term financial performance, and the 
sustainable development strategy, which is positively associated with long-term financial performance. 
Following the natural-resource-based view of the firm, these findings indicate that women on boards 
can be seen as a key resource in the organizational process, which provides a shared vision of the future 
and strong moral leadership to the top management team. 
 
Keywords: Women on Boards, Corporate Environmental Strategy, Latent Class Regression Model, 
Pollution Prevention Strategy, Sustainable Development Strategy 
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1. Introduction 
The spread of national public policies to increase the percentage of women on boards (WoB) has 
been going on for over ten years. Norway first introduced a gender-balance law with quota regulations 
for corporate boards in 2003, and afterward, countries in the EU, such as Sweden, Germany, Italy, 
France, and Spain, followed this initiative to increase the representation of women on boards (Adams, 
2016; Seierstad, Warner-Søderholm, Torchia, & Huse, 2017; Valls Martínez, Cruz Rambaud, & Parra 
Oller, 2019). In addition, developing countries, such as China (Yu Liu, Wei, & Xie, 2014), India and 
Middle Eastern countries (Rao & Tilt, 2016), have also made efforts to increase the number of WoB. 
In Australia, the Australian Securities Exchange requires listed companies to adopt and disclose their 
gender diversity initiatives and gender proportions at all levels, including boards (Ali, Ng, & Kulik, 
2014). Increasing the representation of women on boards is based on both ethical and social factors 
and is related to the issue of gender equality. However, the effects of women on boards on corporate 
strategy and performance and through what mechanisms these effects are manifested remain unknown. 
To address this issue, a large number of studies have investigated the financial benefits of women 
on boards, including enhanced board effectiveness (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Kim & Starks, 2016) and 
the controversial association between women on boards and corporate financial performance (CFP) 
(Conyon & He, 2017; Joecks, Pull, & Vetter, 2013; Yu Liu et al., 2014; Post & Byron, 2015). However, 
the “business case” of female directors cannot sufficiently explain their impact (Ferreira, 2015). 
Gender role theory suggests that the prosocial behavior of women is thought to be more communal 
and relational (Eagly, 2009), which could support a collective, such as a group or organization. At the 
firm level, female directors are found to be more benevolent and universally concerned but less power-
oriented than men (Adams & Funk, 2012); this finding is linked to stronger stakeholder orientation. In 
this regard, empirical evidence has suggested that female directors can outperform in issues related to 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; Harjoto, Laksmana, & Lee, 2015; 
Landry, Bernardi, & Bosco, 2016; McGuinness, Vieito, & Wang, 2017; Rao & Tilt, 2016), especially 
in corporate environmental management. 
Prior studies have usually used the CSR information disclosure score (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012; 
Kaymak & Bektas, 2017; Qiu, Shaukat, & Tharyan, 2016; Xie, Nozawa, Yagi, Fujii, & Managi, 2019), 
the CSR performance rating (Scalet & Kelly, 2010), and specific environmental initiative or particular 
aspects of environmental issues (Ben-Amar, Chang, & McIlkenny, 2017; C. Liu, 2018) as indicators 
of corporate environmental management to investigate the effect of WoB. Furthermore, Li et al. (2017) 
introduced a comprehensive measurement of six specific items related to firm environmental policies. 
However, using these indicators failed to capture the interdependency among corporate environmental 
policies or the systematic patterns of voluntary environmental policies, which is an important feature 
of corporate environmental strategies (Juan Alberto Aragón-Correa & A. Rubio-López, 2007). The 
aforementioned studies strengthened the finding that “women are greener” but did not provide 
evidence of the role of WoB from a strategic point of view in corporate environmental issues. From 
the natural-resource-based view (NRBV) of the firm, the strategic choices regarding a series of 
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corporate environmental policies reflect environmental strategy. Faced with a natural environmental 
challenge, the adoption of a corporate environmental strategy is based on the firm’s capability to 
facilitate environmentally sustainable economic activities and gain a sustained competitive advantage 
(S. L. Hart, 1995). This capability is supported by the key resources a firm possesses, such as physical 
or financial assets, employees’ skills and organizational processes (J. Barney, 1991; J. B. Barney, 
Ketchen, & Wright, 2011). In this context, female presence on boards can be seen as a key resource 
that plays an important role in promoting corporate environmental strategy. However, regarding the 
antecedent of environmental strategies, previous studies on corporate environmental strategy have 
mainly paid attention to environmental protection regulations, stakeholder norms and top managers’ 
environmentally friendly mindsets (Yi Liu, Guo, & Chi, 2015), but few have investigated the role of 
WoB. 
Against this backdrop, this study applied a latent class regression model (LCRM) that allows us 
to simultaneously identify the unobserved corporate environmental strategies and examine the effects 
of WoB on these strategic choices. Following the NRBV and based on 12 environmental policies of 
3389 firms worldwide for the years 2011-2016, we identified four types of corporate environmental 
strategies: an inactive strategy, a reactive strategy, a pollution prevention strategy and a sustainable 
development strategy. Our findings indicate that female presence on boards has positive effects on 
promoting proactive environmental strategies, especially the pollution prevention strategy, which is 
found to bring about sustained competitive advantage in both short-term and long-term financial 
performance, and the sustainable development strategy, which is expected to enhance future 
performance. 
This study contributes to the existing literature in the following aspects. First, unlike previous 
WoB and CSR studies that have used corporate environmental performance (CEP), environmental 
disclosure indexes or a single environmental policy to indicate corporate environmental management, 
this study employed the conceptual framework of corporate environmental strategy to investigate the 
impact of WoB. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the role of WoB 
from the corporate environmental strategy perspective. Second, this study extends the empirical 
research based on the NRBV. As pointed out by Hart and Dowell (2011), due to the difficulty of 
defining sustainable development in the business context (S. L. Hart & Milstein, 2003) and the lack of 
firms committed to sustainable development in the past decade after the theory of the natural-resource-
based view of the firm was developed in 1995, the studies on corporate environmental strategy have 
mainly focused on a pollution prevention strategy but seldom on the sustainable development strategy. 
Our findings provide new empirical evidence to support Hart’s propositions about the proactive 
environmental strategy’s facilitation of a firm’s sustained competitive advantage and emphasize the 
important role of female directors in promoting the sustainable development strategy. Third, this study 
provides significant insights into upper echelons theory by incorporating the impacts of WoB on the 
choice of corporate environmental strategy and highlighting the important role of WoB in the top 
management team (TMT). As Ferreira (2015) criticized, the benefits to society should not be ignored 
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when discussing the business case for female board representation. The question is not whether the 
presence of women on boards matters but rather how and under what circumstances women on boards 
can benefit firm performance. Our findings provide a perspective of corporate environmental strategy 
to investigate the impact of the TMT and useful guidance for business practitioners, corporate decision-
makers, investors and policy-makers concerning board gender diversity and corporate environmental 
management issues. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature on women on boards 
and the effect of having women on boards on corporate environmental strategy and firm performance. 
Section 3 describes the investigated sample and variables used in this study. Section 4 explains the 
methodology, including the latent class regression model and panel data regression models. Section 5 
presents the empirical results and discussion. Finally, we conclude in Section 6. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Women on boards and corporate environmental strategy 
In decision-making regarding a firm’s strategic direction and what influences firm performance, 
the board of directors plays an important role in monitoring and advising (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick 
& Mason, 1984). Prior studies have argued that female directors can improve board effectiveness in 
many aspects, resulting in the better monitoring of management (Adams & Ferreira, 2009) and 
enhanced board advisory effectiveness (Kim & Starks, 2016). However, the business case for female 
board representation can hardly sufficiently explain the impact of female directors; as asserted by 
Ferreira (2015), “when discussing policies that promote women in business, it is better to focus on 
potential benefits to society that go far beyond narrow measures of firm profitability.” From the view 
of gender role theory, the differences in male and female behavior originated from culturally shared 
gender role beliefs (Eagly, 1987), which could imply different prosocial behaviors for women and men 
(Eagly, 2009). In the domain of prosocial behaviors, women are thought to be more communal and 
relational compared to men who are more agentic and collectively oriented as well as strength intensive 
(Eagly, 2009). Adams and Funk (2012) further found consistent results at the board level, suggesting 
that female directors are more benevolent and universally concerned but less power-oriented than men. 
This gender difference at the board level implies that female directors are more likely to have a 
stakeholder orientation (Adams et al., 2011). 
To this end, a large body of the literature has discussed this issue by exploring the effect of female 
directors on CSR performance (Rao & Tilt, 2016). For example, Landry et al. (2016) found that firms 
with a higher percentage of WoB are more likely to appear on corporate recognition lists, including 
the Most Admired Companies, the Most Ethical Companies, the Best Companies for Work, and the 
Best Corporate Citizens. McGuinness et al. (2017) found that female leadership and increased female 
board presence strongly support CSR performance ratings. For corporate environmental management, 
Ben-Amar et al. (2017) provided evidence of the positive relationship between female directors and 
the volunteer disclosure of climate change-related information. However, one limitation to these 
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studies is that using CSR performance ratings or one particular environmental policy as indicators to 
investigate the impact of female board presence fails to capture the decision-making process and the 
interdependency among corporate environmental policies. Li et al. (2017) introduced a score measured 
on six specific items of firm environmental policies as an indirect and objective measurement to 
investigate the impact of board gender diversity. This measurement provided a comprehensive 
evaluation of environmental policy engagement but still did not clarify how those policies combined 
to shape different corporate environmental strategies and their connections to female board presence. 
From the natural-resource-based view of the firm, facing increasingly complex environmental 
challenges, a firm’s competitive advantage depends on a set of strategic capabilities that facilitate 
environmentally sustainable economic activities (S. L. Hart, 1995). These capabilities are reflected by 
distinct corporate environmental strategies that contain systematic patterns of voluntary environmental 
policies, beyond regulatory requirements (Juan Alberto Aragón-Correa & A. Rubio-López, 2007). In 
this context, Hart (1995) introduced three levels of environmental strategies: pollution prevention, 
product stewardship, and sustainable development. Each of these strategies has different 
environmental driving forces, depends on different key resources and brings about different 
competitive advantages (S. L. Hart & Dowell, 2011). Specifically, a pollution prevention strategy aims 
to reduce waste and emissions by the continuous improvement of production processes that reduce the 
inefficient use of materials and human resources rather than through expensive “end-of-pipe” capital 
investment, thereby leading to a potential competitive cost advantage. The product stewardship 
strategy, integrating stakeholder perspectives into the firm’s product development process, applies life 
cycle analysis to minimize the environmental impacts during the product’s entire lifecycle, facilitating 
product differentiation that may be competitively preemptive. Finally, a sustainable development 
strategy attempts to minimize the environmental burden of firm growth and development, which 
entails a shared vision of the future that requires strong moral leadership and an empowering social 
process that penetrates deep into the TMT. 
The NRBV suggests that the adoption of corporate environmental strategies is supported by the 
firm’s key resources (S. L. Hart, 1995). The concept of key resources, derived from the resource-based 
view of the firm, refers to something valuable and nonsubstitutable that a firm possesses, including 
physical or financial assets, employees’ skills and organizational processes (J. Barney, 1991; J. B. 
Barney et al., 2011). As suggested by Hart (1995), the three environmental strategies are 
interconnected, in which the accumulation of key resources plays an important role in determining the 
degree of a firm’s environmental strategic proactivity. On the one hand, a particular sequence of 
resource accumulation exists from the least proactive to the most proactive strategy. For example, 
without the successful accumulation of resources to implement the pollution prevention strategy, it 
would be difficult to adopt next-level strategies such as the product stewardship strategy or sustainable 
development strategy. On the other hand, synergies exist across these strategies, indicating a 
simultaneous or overlapping accumulation of resources for all three strategies. For instance, the shared 
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vision of the future that is required in the sustainable development strategy could be applied to all three 
strategies. 
Given that in the domain of prosocial behavior at the board level, female directors appear to be 
more stakeholder-oriented, female board presence can be seen as an important key resource associated 
with corporate environmental strategy. Corporate environmental strategy contains a series of voluntary 
environmental policies, a latent feature reflecting a firm’s strategic capability. Empirically, prior 
studies have usually identified these strategies by analyzing the observable variables of environmental 
policies based on the conceptual framework of the environmental strategy. Buysse and Verbeke (2003) 
applied cluster analysis and identified three environmental strategies in large firms, namely, the 
reactive strategy, the pollution prevention strategy, and the environmental leadership strategy. The 
reactive strategy is equivalent to an “end-of-pipe” strategy and uses the terms reactive, defensive, 
accommodative, and proactive (RDAP scale) to characterize a corporate strategy on social 
responsiveness (Clarkson, 1995). The environmental leadership strategy is similar to Hart’s 
sustainable development strategy. Aragón-Correa et al. (2008) used principal component analysis and 
followed those terminologies to describe environmental strategies at different stages in small firms. 
However, regarding the antecedents of proactive corporate environmental strategies, most prior studies 
have investigated factors including environmental protection regulations, stakeholder norms and top 
managers’ environmentally friendly mindsets (Yi Liu et al., 2015) while seldom mentioning the role 
of WoB. The role of female board presence in adopting and promoting corporate environmental 
strategy remains unclear. Understanding the antecedents of environmental capabilities is an important 
area (S. L. Hart & Dowell, 2011), and further research on the effect of WoB on corporate 
environmental strategy needs to be conducted to fill this gap. 
 
2.2 Women on boards and corporate financial performance 
Upper echelons theory illustrate the organizational process of how the TMT influences strategic 
choices and therefore leads to different levels of financial performance (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). Following this idea, the effect of WoB on financial performance includes the direct 
impact from WoB and the financial consequences of corporate environmental strategies that are 
predicted by the feature of the TMT. In previous studies, the relationship between WoB and firm 
financial performance has been found to be ambiguous. Post and Byron (2015) investigated the mixed 
effects of WoB on CFP and found that the association varies across firms’ legal/regulatory and 
sociocultural contexts, which can change from country to country. Another explanation for the 
controversial association may be traced to the idea proposed by Kanter (1977) and referred to as critical 
mass theory on board gender diversity: this theory postulates that when the board has only one or two 
female directors, the female directors may just serve in a “token role”, and their impacts on corporate 
decisions will be limited. Women on boards in a boardroom dominated by male directors might face 
difficulty in voicing their opinions, unless the number of female directors reaches a certain number: 
the “magic number” seems to be three (Kristie, 2011). Conyon and He (2017) suggested that a 
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nonlinear relationship exists between WoB and firm performance. Joecks et al. (2013) further found a 
U-shaped relationship between gender diversity and firm performance and that the turning point occurs 
when there are approximately three female directors. 
For the financial outcomes of corporate environmental strategies, the link between environmental 
strategies and sustained competitive advantage or financial performance differs at different stages (S. 
L. Hart, 1995). A large number of studies have revealed the effect of pollution prevention strategies 
across industries and countries (Chen, Ong, & Hsu, 2016; Song, Zhao, & Zeng, 2017), but due to the 
lack of available evidence, attention has seldom been paid to product stewardship and sustainable 
development strategies (S. L. Hart & Dowell, 2011). After investigating a large sample of global 
companies, Miroshnychenko et al. (2017) suggested that pollution prevention and green supply chain 
management are the major environmental drivers of financial performance. At the same time, research 
has also focused on the effect of environmental disclosure as a legitimacy strategy to enhance firms’ 
image and reputation (Lokuwaduge & Heenetigala, 2017). Although there have been fewer empirical 
studies conducted on the other two strategies, Hart (1995) suggested that the sustainable development 
strategy that aims to reduce a firm’s global environmental impact should not be expected to generate 
short-term profits but rather to affect future performance, reflected by measurements such as the price-
to-earnings ratio or market value. 
3. Data 
We constructed a global sample from the Bloomberg ESG (Environmental, Social, and 
Governance) database which provides data that cover over 900 fields of ESG topics. Bloomberg 
Professional Services collects ESG data from firms’ direct resources, such as CSR reports, annual 
reports, proxy statements and corporate governance reports, company websites, and Carbon Disclosure 
Project data. From this database, we obtained 20,334 firm-year observations from 3389 firms for the 
years 2011-2016. 
3.1 Women on boards, board composition, and firm characteristics 
From the corporate governance data, we gathered variables including the percentage of women on 
boards, the percentage of independent directors, CEO duality, the average age of board members, and 
board size. We used asset turnover (ATO) and return on asset (ROA), the accounting-based measures, 
and Tobin’s Q, a market-based measure, as the proxies of financial performance. ATO is calculated 
from the firm’s revenue and total assets to measure the efficiency of a company's use of its assets. 
ROA is calculated from earnings before interest and taxes, interest expenditure, tax expenditure, and 
total assets. Tobin’s Q (total market value divided by total assets) is used to indicate the market value. 
Control variables consist of financial leverage, firm size, R&D intensity and ESG compensation. We 
took the natural logarithm value of the total assets to indicate firm size, and liabilities to assets ratio as 
financial leverage. ESG compensation indicates whether executive compensation is linked to ESG 
goals. The descriptive statistics of each variable are shown in Table 1. 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
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3.2 Corporate environmental policy 
From the environmental data, we obtained data on 12 corporate environmental policies associated 
with the conceptual framework in the NRBV introduced by Hart (1995). Table 2 shows the detailed 
descriptions of these 12 corporate environmental policies adapted from the Bloomberg ESG database. 
According to the features of each policy, we classified these 12 policies into six categories as follows: 
(1) pollutant reduction policies including emissions reduction initiatives and waste reduction policy; 
(2) energy-efficiency-related policies including green building policy and energy efficiency policy; (3) 
climate-change-related policies that consist of climate change policy, climate change opportunities 
discussed, risks of climate change discussed, and new climate-change-related products; (4) 
environmental-management-related policies that include environmental quality management policy 
and environmental supply chain management; (5) sustainability-related policies including sustainable 
packaging; and (6) biodiversity policy. 
The original data on these environmental policies are dummy variables to indicate whether certain 
policies have been implemented. Missing values indicate that there is no information about such policy. 
We recoded the data to reflect the strategic choices on each environmental policy based on two issues: 
information disclosure and policy implementation. Therefore, 3 actions of strategic decisions can be 
observed. Specifically, the policy with missing values is treated as Action 1, denoting that the firm 
neither implemented a certain environmental policy nor disclosed the related information 1 . The 
original data of “0” are treated as Action 2, indicating that the firm did not implement a certain 
environmental policy but disclosed that the policy had not been implemented. The original data of “1” 
are treated as Action 3, indicating that the firm not only implemented a certain environmental policy 
but also disclosed this information. The strategic choices of each policy in the whole sample are shown 
in Table 2. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Latent class regression model 
The latent class model (LCM) is frequently used when the observed indicators are highly 
interrelated. The LCM attempts to seek the source of confounding between observed indicator 
variables by identifying unobserved or latent categorical variables, in which conditional on the latent 
variables, the responses to all of the observed indicators are assumed to be statistically independent; 
this association is typically referred to as local independence (Hagenaars & McCutcheon, 2002; Linzer 
& Lewis, 2011). This kind of association can be frequently found in the field of social and behavioral 
sciences, economics and corporate governance. For instance, Katayama et al. (2018) applied the latent 
 
1
 It is assumed that there is no firm that implemented an environmental policy but did not disclose the information. Thus, the missing 
value of environmental policy in the original data is treated as Action 1. 
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class model to analyze the decision-making structures in firms and identified four kinds of structures 
from the observed data. 
In our case, as shown in Table 3, the observed decisions on corporate environmental policies are 
highly correlated. We identified latent classes with similar choices of corporate environmental policies, 
and this finding indicates different environmental strategies. Furthermore, given the role of WoB in 
decision-making regarding corporate environmental strategies, we investigated how WoB is related to 
each type of strategy. For this investigation, we used the LCRM to simultaneously examine the latent 
classes (or unobserved strategies) of corporate environmental policies and the associations between 
latent classes and WoB. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The LCRM extends the basic latent class model by including covariates (or concomitant variables) 
to predict class membership (Dayton & Macready, 1988; Hagenaars & McCutcheon, 2002). Compared 
with the basic latent class model that calculates the predicted posterior class membership probabilities 
first and then uses these values as dependent variables in a regression model, the “one-step” technique 
of the LCRM approach avoids the biased coefficient estimator (Bolck, Croon, & Hagenaars, 2004). 
In the LCRM approach, if we observe J kinds of corporate environmental policies, then each 
policy has K! choices for firms	i = 1,… , N. Let *"#$ denote the observed values of a certain observed 
corporate environmental policy; then, *"#$ = 1 indicates that firm i chooses the kth action of the jth 
corporate environmental policy, and otherwise, *"#$ = 0, in which j = 1,… , J and k = 1,… , K. We 
assume that there are R latent classes of corporate environmental strategies: let /#%$ denote the class-
conditional probability that the firms in class r = 1,… , R choose the kth action of the jth corporate 
environmental policy. Within each latent class, for each certain corporate environmental policy, 
∑ /"#$
&!
$'(
= 1. Furthermore, let 2%" represent the prior probability of latent class membership, which 
represents the unconditional probability that a firm belongs to each class before taking into account 
the choice of each environmental policy, and for each firm, ∑ 2%"% = 1. The probability that a firm in 
a certain latent class makes a set of strategic choices regarding corporate environmental policies can 
be expressed as Equation (1). 
3(*"; /%) = ∏ ∏ (/#%$))"!#
&!
$'(
*
#'(                                 (1) 
Then, we have the probability density function across all classes as below. 
8(*"|/, 2) = ∑ 2%"+%'( ∏ ∏ (/#%$))"!#
&!
$'(
*
#'(                            (2) 
The posterior probability of each firm’s class membership, conditional on the observed value of 
environmental policies, can be obtained as Equation (3) by using Bayes’ rule. 
8:(;"|<"; *") = ,$%- .()";1$-)∑ ,&%- .()";1&-)'&()                                    (3) 
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The basic LCM assumes that every observation has the same prior probabilities of the latent class 
member, while the LCRM allows for the priors to vary depending on their observed covariates (Linzer 
& Lewis, 2011). Let <" represent the covariates including the variable denoting WoB, other variables 
for board composition. Here, to avoid the problem of reverse causality, following the approaches 
applied by Joecks et al. (2013) and Liu (2018), we used a one-year lagged WoB to predict class 
membership. We further controlled for ATO, financial leverage, and firm size, which are the major 
financial factors significantly related to the absolute CEP from the perspective of material flow cost 
accounting (Yagi & Managi, 2018). A multinomial logit link function was employed to reflect the 
effects of the covariates on the priors (Agresti, 2002). As shown in Equation (4), let the first latent 
class represent the reference class and assume that the log-odds of latent class membership priors with 
respect to the first class are linearly related to the covariates. 
ln ?,$"
,)"
@ = <"A%                                 (4) 
As noted above, for each firm, ∑ 2%" = 1% . Thus, we obtain the unconditional probability that a 
firm belongs to a certain class as below. 
2%" = 2%(<"; A) = 4
*"+$
∑ 4*"+&'&()
                            (5) 
By replacing 2%" in Equation (3) with the function 2%(<"; A) in Equation (5), the posterior class 
membership probabilities in the LCRM are obtained as below. 
8:(;"|<"; *") = ,$(5";6
7).()";1$-)
∑ ,&(5";67).()";1&-)
'
&()
                               (6) 
Maximum likelihood estimation is utilized to estimate the parameters, including the coefficients 
of covariates A%B, the priors 2%8C  and the class-conditional probabilities /%C. To determine the number 
of classes, we used the Akaike information criterion, or AIC (Akaike, 1998), and Bayesian information 
criterion, or BIC (Schwarz, 1978), as the indicators of goodness of fit. The preferred model is the one 
with the minimum values of AIC or BIC. 
 
4.2 Panel data regression model 
To investigate the relationships among female directors, corporate environmental strategy and 
financial performance, we specified the following panel data regression models. We examined how 
female directors are related to CFP, as shown in Equation (7), in which CFP9: indicates dependent 
variables including ATO, ROA and Tobin’s Q. Here, both ATO and ROA are used to measure short-
term financial performance, given that ROA is an unstable indicator since it can be decomposed into 
factors such as ATO and profit margin that may be negatively correlated with each other (Yagi & 
Managi, 2018). <"; controls for the variables of board composition and firm characteristics. Here, we 
used the one-year lag of WoB as the independent variable to deal with the problem of potential reverse 
causality (Joecks et al., 2013; C. Liu, 2018). By using the variables of the identified latent class 
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membership of environmental strategies, we further explored how the environmental strategies are 
related to CFP, as shown in Equation (8). 
CFP9: = G< + A=IJKLM	JM	NJO;P",;?( + A@<"; + Q" + L";            (7) 
CFP9: = G< + AARSOTT"; + A@<"; + Q" + L";                         (8) 
In both the LCRM and the panel data regression models, we controlled for board composition and 
firm characteristics. Board independence contains two dimensions: the independent director, which is 
proxied by the percentage of independent directors on the board, and CEO duality, which indicates 
whether the company’s CEO is also the chairperson of the board. In terms of the CSR issue, directors’ 
individual attitudes toward CSR play an important role in the decisions of CSR practice. Previous 
evidence has shown that outside directors are less profit-driven and more sensitive to philanthropic 
endeavors than are inside directors (Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1995). Many studies have also argued that 
outside directors present not only shareholders’ interests but also other stakeholders’ interests (Rao & 
Tilt, 2016; Zhang, 2012). According to agency theory, the concern of CEO duality is that the lack of 
board independence would fail to limit managerial entrenchment and opportunism (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), which would have a negative impact on financial performance and harm the interests of 
shareholders. Regarding CSR issues, a chairperson who is also the CEO may place much more 
attention on corporate operations than on environmental or social issues. Previous studies have also 
provided evidence that CEO duality has a negative effect on CSR performance (de Villiers, Naiker, & 
van Staden, 2011; Webb, 2004). In addition, age can be treated as an indicator of management 
experience and maturity in directing the business (Hafsi & Turgut, 2013). Here, we used the average 
age of board members as a control variable. Regarding board size, Jizi et al. (2013) found that a larger 
board, usually treated as one that supports shareholders’ interests, also promotes stakeholders’ interests. 
A larger board is linked to strong environmental performance (de Villiers et al., 2011). However, 
Amran et al. (2014) found that there is no significant relationship between board size and sustainability 
reporting quality. In this study, we controlled for board size by using the number of board members. 
Firm characteristics such as ESG compensation, financial leverage, firm size, and industry are 
controlled for in both the LCRM and the panel data regression models. In the panel data regression 
models, we further controlled for the country dummies, as the association between WoB and financial 
performance varies across countries, as pointed out by Post and Byron (2015). 
5. Results 
5.1 The latent corporate environmental strategy 
We ran the LCRM from 2 to 5 classes on our data. For the data-driven process, the optimal number 
of classes is based on the AIC and BIC. Lower values of AIC or BIC indicate a better fit. As shown in 
Table 4, both the AIC and BIC of the 5 classes are the lowest, which indicates that based on the data-
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driven results, 5 classes should be the optimal classification. However, the estimated results of four 
classes are found to be more concise and accordant with the NRBV introduced by Hart (1995)2. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Figure 1 displays the four identified latent corporate environmental strategies. Following the 
typology developed by Hart (1995) and Buysse and Verbeke (2003), we named each latent class after 
the feature of strategic choices in each category of environmental policy, which is illustrated by the 
conditional probabilities of choice for each corporate environmental policy. First, the Class 1 strategy 
is called the inactive strategy: firms in this class have a high probability of having an Action 1 response 
for all environmental policies, which means that these firms will neither implement nor disclose any 
investigated environmental policy. Then, the Class 4 strategy is called the reactive strategy, since firms 
in Class 4 opt for Action 2 for all environmental policies, responding to the survey and disclosing the 
information about their environmental policies. However, it is important to note that the action of 
information disclosure here refers to disclosing the unfavorable information that the firm did not 
implement certain environmental policies but only shows the least responsiveness to environmental 
issues. The remaining classes present two different types of proactive environmental strategies 
associated with the NRBV. Under the Class 2 strategy, two policies are highly likely to be implemented: 
emissions reduction initiatives in the category of pollution reduction and an energy efficiency policy 
in the category of energy efficiency. The Class 2 strategy is called the pollution prevention strategy, 
denoting the strategy in which firms aim to reduce environmental emissions through enhancing the 
efficient use of energy rather than through expensive “end-of-pipe” capital investment (Buysse & 
Verbeke, 2003; S. L. Hart, 1995; S. L. Hart & Dowell, 2011). Firms in Class 3 are likely to implement 
the following: both emissions reduction initiatives and waste reduction policies in the pollution 
reduction category; both environmental quality management policies and environmental supply chain 
management in the environmental management category; energy efficiency policies; and climate 
change policies. To reflect this implementation, Class 3 is labeled the sustainable development strategy 
since this approach integrates the environmental management system into the production process and 
entails making efforts to address the global issue of climate change; it is similar to Hart’s sustainable 
development strategy. For the estimated class population share, 35.7% of the investigated firms are 
likely to practice the inactive strategy, followed by the pollution prevention strategy (25.4%), the 
sustainable development strategy (23.3%), and the reactive strategy (15.7%). 
 
 
2 In the estimated results of the five classes, based on the definition of corporate environmental strategy in the NRBV, two of the classes 
can be seen as an identical strategy, pollution prevention strategy (see Supplementary Table A3 and Table A4), and are therefore 
classified as a similar class in the results of the four classes (see Supplementary Table A1 and Table A2). Furthermore, as for the 
association between strategies and financial outcomes, the results of four classes are consistent with those of five classes (see 
Supplementary Table A7 and Table A8). 
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[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
  
5.2 Women on boards and corporate environmental strategy 
In this section, the effects of female directors on the strategic choices of corporate environmental 
strategies are examined. In Table 5, the dependent variables for LCRM are the log-odds of latent class 
membership priors with respect to the first class, the inactive strategy. Thus, the coefficients indicate 
the effect on the log-ratio prior probability ln	(pB9/p(9), which denotes to what extent firms will 
choose a certain strategy against an inactive strategy. A one-year lagged variable of women on boards 
is used to avoid the problem of reverse causality. For the reactive strategy, the pollution prevention 
strategy, and the sustainable development strategy, the percentage of WoB exhibits positive and 
significant effects. Particularly, considering the magnitude of the coefficients, the effect of WoB is 
found to be stronger in the sustainable development strategy, followed by the pollution prevention 
strategy and the reactive strategy. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Given that the association between female directors and environmental strategy may result from 
the various environmental regulations in different sectors, we introduced sector fixed effects into the 
LCRM. Then, following Equation (6), we converted the log-ratios into predicted prior probabilities 
for each latent class by sector to display the marginal effect of female directors on environmental 
policy strategy. The results are shown in Figure 2. For all sectors, as the percentage of WoB increases, 
the probabilities of choosing both the inactive strategy and the reactive strategy decrease. In terms of 
the pollution prevention strategy, a positive relationship is found in the energy, financials, 
telecommunications service, and real estate sectors. Furthermore, in all sectors, the sustainable 
development strategy presents a positive relationship with WoB. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
These results indicate that firms that have a higher percentage of women on their board are more 
likely to engage in proactive environmental management, which is consistent with gender role theory 
and the hypothesis of female directors’ stakeholder orientation. Regarding information disclosure, 
regardless of favorable or unfavorable information, our results are consistent with prior studies 
showing that female presence on boards is positively related to voluntary CSR information disclosure 
(Ben-Amar et al., 2017; Valls Martínez et al., 2019). Beyond the least responsible and responsive 
environmental practice by choosing the reactive strategy, firms with more female presence on boards 
are more likely to step forward to the next stages of corporate environmental strategy, such as the 
pollution prevention strategy and sustainable development strategy. It is worth noting that the strongest 
positive relationship between WoB and the sustainable development strategy indicates that from the 
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NRBV perspective, female presence on boards can be seen as a key resource in the organizational 
process that provides a shared vision of the future and strong moral leadership to the TMT for adopting 
the sustainable development strategy. Moreover, this resource accumulation can be applied to all the 
other proactive environmental strategies and promote the corporate environmental strategy from one 
stage to the next. Among the remaining control variables, firm size, as an indicator of physical or 
financial assets, also presents a similar relationship with corporate environmental strategies. 
 
5.3 Women on boards, corporate environmental strategy and financial performance 
Table 6 shows the relationship between WoB and financial performance, and the financial 
outcomes of corporate environmental strategies predicted by WoB. First, we directly examined the 
financial effect of WoB, and the results show that there is no significant effect on ATO and ROA but 
a significant and positive relationship with Tobin’s Q. 
For corporate environmental strategies, first, the reactive strategy presents a positive and significant 
relationship with ATO without deteriorating profitability, while it has no significant relationship with 
firm value. As a step toward pursuing a proactive environmental strategy, the strategy in which the 
firm assumes the least responsibility for and exhibits the least responsiveness on environmental issues 
results in better short-term financial performance but fails to increase firm value since there is no 
positive response of the market to such unfavorable information. However, this result implies that 
transparency does not jeopardize financial performance. Second, the pollution prevention strategy is 
positively and significantly related to both ATO and Tobin’s Q, but presents no significant relationship 
with ROA. These results are consistent with previous studies, indicating that pollution control practices 
could be beneficial to short-term financial performance (S. L. Hart & Ahuja, 1996; Maas, Schuster, & 
Hartmann, 2014). Finally, the sustainable development strategy has no significant relationship with 
both ATO and ROA but is positively and significantly related to Tobin’s Q. Hart (1997) distinguished 
the pollution prevention strategy as a “greening” strategy that solves the environmental issues on 
today’s products and the sustainable development strategy as a “beyond greening” strategy that focuses 
on tomorrow’s technologies and markets. In this regard, the uncertainty associated with achieving a 
competitive advantage driven by a sustainable development strategy can hardly result in a positive 
relationship with short-term financial performance. In contrast, the benefits of the sustainable 
development strategy are reflected by the firm’s market value, which implies a long-term vision. The 
relatively larger coefficient of the sustainable development strategy compared with that of the pollution 
prevention strategy also indicates that both the favorable information disclosure and the potential 
future position achievable through substantial technological change bring about higher market 
valuation. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
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Furthermore, we performed a robustness analysis on the panel data regression models. The results 
are reported in Table 7. Following critical mass theory (Joecks et al., 2013; Kanter, 1977), we replace 
the percentage of WoB by using the dummy variable that indicates three or more female directors on 
the board. It presents a weak negative relationship between WoB and ROA. The results of impacts on 
ATO and Tobin’s Q are consistent. Then, we use the posterior class membership probability of each 
environmental strategy as an independent variable to replace each firm’s predicted class membership 
and rerun the regression models. The results of corporate environmental strategies consistently hold. 
These results also show that proactive environmental strategies, especially the sustainable 
development strategy, are more strongly related to market-based than accounting-based measures of 
CFP, which are consistent with the CEP-CFP relationships in previous studies (Busch & Lewandowski, 
2018; Dixon-Fowler, Slater, Johnson, Ellstrand, & Romi, 2013), indicating that the financial benefits 
of enhancing the degree of environmental strategic proactivity are expected at least in the long run. 
Furthermore, the different effects on accounting-based performance demonstrate that the improvement 
in short-term CFP is mainly reflected by ATO rather than ROA. Given the instability of ROA which 
often leads to inconsistent empirical results (Yagi & Managi, 2018), our finding also indicates that 
using solely ROA as CFP indicator may neglect other potential financial impacts of corporate 
environmental strategies.  
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Regarding the problem of endogeneity between corporate environmental strategy and short term 
financial performance, the results show that ATO in the previous year can hardly be seen as an 
important factor affecting the strategic choice of environmental management. First, as for the reactive 
strategy, there is a significant and negative link between ATO in the previous year and the choice of a 
reactive strategy rather than an inactive strategy (see Table 5), which indicates that the higher the 
ATO in the previous year is, the lower the probability of choosing a reactive strategy. Second, there 
is no significant relationship between a one-year lagged ATO and the choice of a pollution prevention 
strategy. Regarding the financial outcome resulting from practicing these environmental strategies, 
both the reactive strategy and pollution prevention strategy are found to be significantly and positively 
related to ATO in the current year. These results indicate that practicing environmental strategies is 
not driven by ATO; antithetically, such strategies may enhance ATO. Furthermore, the sustainable 
development strategy is found to have no significant relationship with ATO in the current year. 
However, a one-year lagged ATO is significantly and positively related to the choice of a sustainable 
development strategy. In this regard, ATO can be seen as the resource necessary for practicing a 
sustainable development strategy. Given the difficulty in accumulating resources for this capability, 
firms with low ATO are unlikely to be able to adopt a sustainable development strategy. On the other 
hand, the environmental driving force of the sustainable development strategy makes it difficult to 
bring about better short-term CFP. In addition, the results of a one-year lagged ATO in the LCRM 
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show relatively low significance. Thus, no sufficient evidence was found to consider ATO as an 
important determinant of the corporate environmental strategy, especially for a reactive strategy and 
a pollution prevention strategy. Instead, the corporate environmental strategy could be the source of a 
competitive advantage reflected by the firm’s ATO.  
Given the effect of female directors on the choice of environmental strategy noted above, firms that 
have a higher percentage of WoB are more likely to adopt a proactive environmental strategy, 
especially a sustainable development strategy, which is positively associated with long-term financial 
performance. These results further indicate that female presence on boards, as a key resource, plays an 
important role in providing a shared vision of the future to promote corporate environmental strategy. 
6. Conclusions 
Gender diversity on the board of directors has been widely discussed for decades, but studying the 
business case for female board representation cannot sufficiently explain the impact of female directors 
(Ferreira, 2015). Prior literature has provided empirical evidence to support gender policy on boards, 
but now the question is not whether to have women on boards but rather how and under what 
circumstances women on boards could benefit firm performance. 
In this study, we examined 3389 firms’ corporate environmental policies for the years 2011-2016 
and investigated the impact of WoB on corporate environmental strategy and financial performance. 
Based on the disclosure and implementation of 12 corporate environmental policies, four types of 
corporate environmental strategies are identified by using the latent class regression model, including 
an inactive strategy, a reactive strategy, a pollution prevention strategy, and a sustainable development 
strategy. Our finding suggests that firms choosing the inactive strategy occupied 35.7% of the 
investigated sample, followed by the pollution prevention strategy (25.4%), the sustainable 
development strategy (23.3%), and the reactive strategy (15.7%). The presence of women on boards 
has a significant and positive impact on promoting proactive environmental strategies, such as a 
pollution prevention strategy and a sustainable development strategy. Furthermore, the financial 
benefits of female directors are reflected by the positive impact on the firm’s market value rather than 
its profitability. The financial consequences of corporate environmental strategies suggest that firms 
adopting a reactive strategy or a pollution prevention strategy are found to have a better short-term 
financial performance. A pollution prevention strategy or a sustainable development strategy could 
lead to higher market value. 
This study provides significant insights into gender diversity on boards from an environmental 
strategy perspective. The evidence of the female director’s positive effect on promoting proactive 
environmental strategy indicates that WoB can be seen as a key resource enhancing a firm’s capability 
of environmental management. For policymakers concerned with corporate gender policy and 
environmental policy, our findings provide a clear picture of the current situation and possible 
development of the corporate environmental strategy. For business practitioners, corporate decision-
makers, and investors concerned with board gender diversity and corporate environmental 
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management issues, our findings provide scenarios about possible strategic directions associated with 
corporate environmental strategy when increasing female presence on boards and how these 
environmental strategies perform financially. 
One limitation of this study is that due to insufficient information, we fail to identify the product 
stewardship strategy, another important stage of proactive environmental strategies associated with the 
NRBV. The manifest variables gathered from secondary data can hardly cover all the items related to 
the theory, which limits the analysis of the latent corporate environmental strategy. However, the 
current situation is that it is difficult to collect such detailed information for a very large sample through 
a questionnaire survey (Li et al., 2017). 
Regarding this issue, we propose some ideas for future research. First, conducting an in-depth 
survey on corporate environmental policies for regional target samples and collecting more integrated 
empirical evidence on corporate environmental strategies could enhance the accuracy of latent strategy 
analysis. Furthermore, collecting and integrating updated environmental policy-related information 
disclosed by firms and applying content analysis to build a large dataset could also provide more 
detailed evidence of the role of WoB in corporate environmental strategy. Future research could also 
consider the interaction effect of WoB and other factors, such as managerial factors inside firms or 
business environment factors outside firms, to deepen our understanding of the role of WoB in 
strengthening firms’ dynamic capability to conduct corporate environmental strategies. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Panel 1. Board composition 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Women on board t-1 (percentage) 8.50 10.78 0.00 71.43 
Independent director (percentage) 49.29 31.35 0.00 100.00 
CEO duality 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Average age 59.90 5.13 25.13 97.00 
Board size 9.24 2.73 3.00 28.00 
Panel 2. Firm characteristics 
 Mean SD Min Max 
ATO 0.96 0.72 0.00 11.68 
ATO t-1 0.98 0.73 0.00 12.13 
ROA 0.06 0.06 -0.26 0.88 
Tobin’s Q 1.24 1.22 0.002 22.63 
Leverage 0.49 0.20 0.00 0.99 
Firm size 21.45 1.68 15.65 27.29 
RD intensity 0.03 0.08 0.00 1.27 
ESG compensation 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. The investigated samples cover 48 countries or districts, among which 
the United States accounts for 42.96%, followed by Japan (28.42%), China (10.15%), the United Kingdom (2.42%), Hong Kong (2.12%), 
Canada (2.10%), Australia (1.39%), France (1.36%), South Africa (1.33%), Sweden (0.97%), Malaysia (0.65%), etc. The sector 
distribution is as follows: energy (4.16%), materials (9.21%), industrials (20.60%), consumer discretionary (14.87%), consumer staples 
(6.23%), health care (7.38%), financials (15.37%), information technology (12.39%), telecommunications services (1.09%), utilities 
(2.92%), and real estate (5.78%). 
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Table 2. Description of corporate environmental policies 
Environmental Policy Description 
Strategic Choices 
Action 1 
Obs./ 
Freq. 
Action 2 
Obs./ 
Freq. 
Action 3 
Obs./ 
Freq. 
P
o
llu
ta
n
t r
e
d
u
c
tio
n
 
E1 Emissions Reduction Initiatives Initiatives to reduce its environmental emissions 
7,266 
(35.73%) 
4,072 
(20.03%) 
8,996 
(44.24%) 
E2 Waste Reduction Policy Initiatives to reduce the waste generated during 
the course of its operations 
7,277  
(35.79%) 
5,423  
(26.67%) 
7,634 
(37.54%) 
E
n
e
r
g
y
 e
ffic
ie
n
c
y
 
E3 Green Building Policy Policy of using environmental technologies 
and/or environmental principles in the design and 
construction of its buildings 
7,268  
(35.74%) 
10,337 
(50.84%)  
2,729  
(13.42%) 
E4 Energy Efficiency Policy Initiatives to make its use of energy more efficient 
7,280  
(35.80%) 
3,443  
(16.93%) 
9,611  
(47.27%) 
C
lim
a
te
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 
E5 Climate Change Policy Policy to help reduce global greenhouse gas 
emissions that cause climate change through its 
ongoing operations and/or the use of its products 
and services 
7,266  
(35.73%) 
6,417  
(31.56%) 
6,651  
(32.71%) 
E6 Climate Change Opportunities 
Discussed 
Discussion about business opportunities related to 
climate change in management discussion and 
analysis (MD&A) and its equivalent section of 
the company's annual report 
7,271 
(35.76%) 
12,924 
(63.56%) 
139 
(0.68%) 
E7 Risks of Climate Change Discussed Discussion about business risks related to climate 
change in management discussion and analysis 
(MD&A) and its equivalent section of the 
company's annual report 
7,268  
(35.74%) 
11,529  
(56.70%) 
1,537  
(7.56%) 
E8 New Products - Climate Change Policy of developing and/or launching products, 
during the current period only, which address 
future impacts of climate change and/or which 
mitigate customers' contributions to climate 
change by reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. The products may or may not be new 
to the market 
7,287  
(35.84%) 
12,795  
(62.92%) 
252  
(1.24%) 
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E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
ta
l m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
E9 Environmental Quality Management 
Policy 
Policy to introduce any kind of environmental 
quality management and/or environmental 
management system to help reduce the 
environmental footprint of its operations 
7,266  
(35.73%) 
5,890  
(28.97%) 
7,178  
(35.30%) 
E10 Environmental Supply Chain 
Management 
Initiatives to reduce the environmental footprint 
of its supply chain. Environmental footprint 
reductions could be achieved by reducing waste, 
by reducing resource use, by reducing 
environmental emissions, by insisting on the 
introduction of environmental management 
systems, etc. in the supply chain 
7,277  
(35.79%) 
7,620  
(37.47%) 
5,437  
(26.74%) 
S
u
sta
in
a
b
ility
 
E11 Sustainable Packaging Policies to make its packaging more 
environmentally friendly 
 
7,277  
(35.79%) 
11,333  
(55.73%) 
1,724  
(8.48%) 
B
io
d
iv
e
r
sity
 
E12 Biodiversity Policy Initiatives to ensure the protection of biodiversity. 
This might include trees and vegetation as well as 
wildlife and endangered species. Field is part of 
the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
group of fields 
7,267  
(35.74%) 
9,518  
(46.81%) 
3,549  
(17.45%) 
Note: The trend of strategic choices regarding corporate environmental policies from 2011 to 2016 is shown in Supplementary Figure 
A1.  
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Table 3. Correlation of strategic choices regarding corporate environmental policies 
 
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10 E11 E12 
E1 1.000            
E2 0.803 1.000           
E3 0.726 0.726 1.000          
E4 0.877 0.829 0.724 1.000         
E5 0.837 0.751 0.714 0.801 1.000        
E6 0.708 0.706 0.707 0.705 0.709 1.000       
E7 0.707 0.705 0.709 0.704 0.707 0.715 1.000      
E8 0.708 0.707 0.708 0.705 0.711 0.715 0.707 1.000     
E9 0.783 0.799 0.710 0.791 0.762 0.709 0.707 0.709 1.000    
E10 0.775 0.802 0.726 0.773 0.755 0.706 0.705 0.711 0.770 1.000   
E11 0.720 0.737 0.712 0.723 0.717 0.705 0.704 0.707 0.719 0.737 1.000  
E12 0.753 0.753 0.716 0.738 0.764 0.712 0.712 0.710 0.751 0.757 0.716 1.000 
Note: This table shows Cramér's V values among the variables of corporate environmental policy. 
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Table 4. The goodness of fit of the LCRM by number of classes 
Number of Classes BIC AIC Log-likelihood 
2 classes 177,270 176,684 -88,268 
3 classes 142,388 141,406 -70,579 
4 classes 134,737 133,359 -66,506 
5 classes 133,918 132,144 -65,848 
Note: This table shows the goodness of fit of the LCRM. Smaller values of AIC or BIC indicate a better fit. 
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Table 5. Results of the LCRM predicted by the percentage of WoB (4 classes) 
Variables  
Class 2 
Pollution 
Prevention Strategy 
 
Class 3 
Sustainable 
Development 
Strategy 
 
Class 4 
Reactive Strategy 
Women on boardt-1 
 
0.028*** 
(0.003) 
 
0.036*** 
(0.004) 
 
0.016*** 
(0.002) 
Board composition       
Independent directors 
 
-0.023*** 
(0.001) 
 
-0.051*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
CEO duality 
 
-0.664*** 
(0.053) 
 
-0.146** 
(0.063) 
 
-0.214*** 
(0.049) 
Board size 
 
0.032*** 
(0.010) 
 
0.048*** 
(0.011) 
 
-0.034*** 
 (0.011) 
Average age  
 
-0.113*** 
(0.005) 
 
0.041*** 
(0.007) 
 
-0.016*** 
(0.005) 
Firm characteristics       
ESG compensation 
 
0.832*** 
(0.141) 
 
1.834*** 
(0.153) 
 
0.479*** 
(0.149) 
ATOt-1 
 
-0.004 
(0.040) 
 
0.100* 
(0.053) 
 
-0.070* 
(0.039) 
Leverage  
 
-1.655*** 
(0.137) 
 
-2.032*** 
(0.166) 
 
-2.187*** 
(0.135) 
Firm size  
 
0.966*** 
(0.022) 
 
1.659*** 
(0.032) 
 
0.587*** 
(0.021) 
(Intercept) 
 
-10.433*** 
(0.438) 
 
-32.103*** 
(0.690) 
 
-9.043*** 
(0.425) 
Sector fixed  YES  YES  YES 
Year fixed  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  20,334  20,334  20,334 
Note: The significance levels are as follows: * denotes p < 0.1, ** denotes p < 0.05, and *** denotes p < 0.01. To test the robustness of 
latent class regression estimation, based on the critical mass theory, we replaced the one-year lagged percentage of WoB by using the 
one-year lagged dummy variable of three or female directors (see Supplementary Table A5). The results are consistent. 
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Table 6. Results of the fixed effects regression on corporate financial performance 
Variables  ATO  ROA  Tobin’s Q 
L1.Women on board  0.0005   -0.0001   0.004**  
  (0.0004)   (0.0001)   (0.002)  
Reactive strategy   0.037***   0.004   0.034 
   (0.011)   (0.002)   (0.053) 
Pollution prevention    0.030***   -0.001   0.153*** 
   (0.009)   (0.002)   (0.049) 
Sustainable development    0.017   -0.0001   0.229*** 
   (0.011)   (0.002)   (0.052) 
Independent directors  -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.00004 -0.00004  0.002* 0.002* 
  (0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO duality  0.001 0.001  0.0003 0.0002  -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.025) (0.025) 
Average age  0.002 0.002  -0.0002 -0.0002  0.014*** 0.013*** 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Board size  -0.004*** -0.004**  0.00002 0.00002  0.007* 0.007* 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.004) (0.004) 
ESG compensation  -0.022 -0.021  -0.003 -0.004  0.06 0.06 
  (0.018) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.039) (0.040) 
Leverage   0.170*** 0.172***  -0.105*** -0.105***  -0.481*** -0.471*** 
  (0.043) (0.043)  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.173) (0.173) 
Firm size  -0.233*** -0.233***  -0.010*** -0.010***  0.079 0.068 
  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.056) (0.055) 
RD intensity  -0.732*** -0.733***  -0.390*** -0.389***  -1.184 -1.208 
  (0.072) (0.072)  (0.084) (0.084)  (1.115) (1.108) 
Sector fixed  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Country fixed  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Observations  16,171 16,171  14,721 14,721  12,514 12,514 
Hausman test  *** ***  *** ***  *** *** 
R2  0.13 0.132  0.086 0.087  0.015 0.017 
Note: The table shows the regression results of corporate environmental strategy and female directors on ATO, ROA, and Tobin’s Q. 
Class membership is predicted by the percentage of WoB. The significance levels are as follows: * denotes p < 0.1, ** denotes p < 0.05, 
and *** denotes p < 0.01. 
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Table 7. Robustness test of regression on corporate financial performance 
Variables  ATO  ROA  Tobin’s Q 
L1.Female directors >= 3  0.002 
 
 -0.003*   0.043* 
 
 (0.007) 
 
 (0.001)   (0.024) 
 
Reactive strategy (Pr.)   0.038***   0.003   0.029 
  (0.012)   (0.002)   (0.056) 
Pollution prevention (Pr.)  
 
0.033***   -0.001  
 
0.161*** 
 
 
(0.010)   (0.002)  
 
(0.054) 
Sustainable development (Pr.)  
 
0.003   0.001  
 
0.222*** 
 
 
(0.013)   (0.003)  
 
(0.052) 
Independent directors  -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.00004 -0.00004  0.002** 0.002* 
 (0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO duality  0.001 0.001  0.0003 0.0002  -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.009) (0.009)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.025) (0.025) 
Average age  0.002 0.002  -0.0002 -0.0002  0.014*** 0.013*** 
 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Board size  -0.004** -0.004**  0.00002 0.00002  0.007* 0.007* 
 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.004) (0.004) 
ESG compensation  -0.021 -0.019  -0.003 -0.004  0.068* 0.063 
 (0.018) (0.018)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.039) (0.040) 
Leverage   0.169*** 0.172***  -0.105*** -0.105***  -0.479*** -0.471*** 
 
 (0.043) (0.043)  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.173) (0.173) 
Firm size  -0.232*** -0.232***  -0.010*** -0.010***  0.083 0.068 
 
 (0.015) (0.015)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.056) (0.056) 
RD intensity  -0.732*** -0.732***  -0.390*** -0.389***  -1.184 -1.21 
 
 (0.072) (0.072)  (0.084) (0.084)  (1.113) (1.107) 
Sector fixed  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Country fixed  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Observations  16,171 16,171  14,721 14,721  12,514 12,514 
Hausman test  *** ***  *** ***  *** *** 
R2  0.13 0.132  0.086 0.087  0.014 0.017 
Note: The table shows the robustness test of the regression on ATO, ROA, and Tobin’s Q. The class membership is predicted by the 
percentage of WoB. The significance levels are as follows: * denotes p < 0.1, ** denotes p < 0.05, and *** denotes p < 0.01. We further 
used the latent classes predicted by the dummy variable of three or more female directors as the independent variable. The results are 
reported in Supplementary Table A6 and show consistency. Moreover, we replicated the panel data regression by using the estimated 
results of five classes predicted by the percentage of WoB and the dummy variable of three or more female directors (see Supplementary 
Table A7 and Table A8). The results are consistent and robust. 
 31 
 
 
Figure 1. The four identified types of corporate environmental strategies 
Note: Four types of corporate environmental strategies are identified as follows: Class 1, inactive strategy; Class 2, pollution prevention strategy; Class 3, sustainable development strategy; and Class 4, 
reactive strategy (see Supplementary Table A1 for detailed results on the conditional probabilities of strategic choice for each corporate environmental policy). 
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Figure 2. The marginal effect of women on boards on corporate environmental strategy by sector 
Note: The figure shows the marginal effect of women on boards on the prior possibility of latent class membership by sector in 2015, given that the other variables are unchanged. 
